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ABSTRACT
With the increase in the complexity of supply chain management, the use of
intelligent agents for automated trading has gained popularity (Collins,
Arunachalam, B, et al. 2006). The performance of supply-chain agents depends on
not just the market environment (supply and demand patterns) but also on what
types of other agents they are competing with. For designers of such agents it is
important to ascertain that their agents are robust and can adapt to changing
market and competitive environments. However, to date there has not been any
work done that assesses the adaptability of a trading agent’s strategy in the
presence of various demand and supply distributions when competing with a
changing composition of agents using different strategies.
In this paper we use the concept of replicator dynamics to study the evolution of a
population of strategies used by supply chain agents when the different agents are
competing against each other. We also study the evolution of the population of
agents’ strategies in the presence of six types of adverse market conditions. In
particular we test three strategies that have been presented in the literature and
our results indicate that over time supply chain agents gravitate towards using the
SCMaster strategy in most scenarios.
Keywords: word; multi-agent systems, replicator dynamics, reinforcement
learning, artificial intelligence, e-commerce, simulation, supply chain management,
evolutionary game theory
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INTRODUCTION
Introduction of the Research
According to the report from Acquity Group (2014), more than 68 percent of buyers
purchase goods online, and the number of respondents who spent 90 percent or
more of their budgets online has doubled from 2013. As seen in the report, IT
already became a force and key driver of globalization (Ejiaku 2014), and
enterprises come to have a variety of options on their supply chain. However, the
management of a supply chain has been a challenging problem since it is recognized
as a complex adaptive system requiring dynamic and flexible reactions against the
changes of environment (Choi, Dooley, and Rungtusanatham 2001). You et al.
(2017) also indicated that the dynamics of supplier selection is important to improve
the performance of a supply chain. To deal with these complexities in supply chain
management, an intelligent trading agent can be a good alternative for the
automation of supply chain management (Collins et al. 2006).
The supply chain trading agent automatically operates all aspects of supply chain
management such as inventory management, procurement, bidding to auction for
sales, and the scheduling for shipment and production. Since the purpose of supply
chain trading agent is to maximize the profit, the performance of a supply chain
trading agent is measured by its profit. One important requirement of trading agents
for achieving higher profit is the adaptability of their strategy to deal with the
environmental changes. For example, if the actual customer demand is lower than
a trading agent’s demand prediction and the agent uses a fixed strategy, then the
supply chain agent would end up with an excessive inventory regardless of the
actual demand amount. However, if the agent has an adaptive strategy, it would
update the inventory level threshold based on the actual demand level.
In a real-world supply chain, agents using various strategies compete against each
other for the resources, such as customer orders and the supply of raw materials, to
increase their profits. However, testing the performance of a supply chain trading
agent in real-world situations is difficult due to the lack of control of market
environment (e.g., demand and supply level and competitors in the same market)
and the difficulties in accessing agents’ performance (profit). For such limitations,
Saar-Tsechansky (2015) suggested simulation as a good alternative for this
category of studies to evaluate the performance of a model. Since a supply chain is
composed of multiple actors and their interactions, agent-based modeling and
simulation (ABMS) can be considered a viable modeling method for a supply chain.
ABMS is rooted in complex adaptive system (CAS), so it provides a modeling
method for agents’ dynamic interactions simulated repeatedly over time. Due to
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this advantage for modeling of CAS, it has gained attention in various areas such
as sociology, biology, operations research, and economics (Macal and North 2009).
One of the problems in managing a supply chain is the complex and stochastic
demand patterns causing time-varying state. For these problems, mathematical or
optimization techniques are not able to provide solutions, but artificial intelligence
algorithms could provide learning ability to self-adapting agent (Mortazavi et al.
2015). Therefore, some studies on supply chain trading agent focus on the
application of the adaptive learning techniques on the basis of ABMS while others
use optimization-based solutions.
The performance of supply-chain agents depends on not just the market
environment (supply and demand patterns) but also on what types of other agents
they are competing with. Most of the studies in the literature evaluate the
performance of such agents in static market conditions (i.e., supply and demand
patterns) and competition environments (i.e., the composition of the competing
agents does not change). In real world situations the composition of competition is
dynamic; weaker agents do not survive whereas stronger agents become more
established. Moreover, the performance of the agents itself depends on such
composition (stronger agents do better when competing against weaker agents than
when competing against other stronger agents). It is this constant feedback loop
(where performance depends on composition of agents, but the composition of
agents in turn depends on their performance) that we have tried to simulate in our
experiments. For designers of such agents it is important to ascertain that their
agents are robust and can adapt to changing market and competitive environments.
In this study we assess the adaptability of our trading agent SCMaster (Lee and
Sikora (2016)) by observing it’s growth in a population composed of supply chain
trading agents drawn from the literature. Through this study we not only evaluate
the adaptability of our agent’s strategy, but also propose a simulation framework to
study the survivability of a trading agent in a complex adaptive system (in a trading
market). In addition, we expect that this approach could be used as a viable method
in trading agent industry for the prediction of the success and evaluation of trading
agents.
For our simulation, we adopted and modified the simulation framework of a supply
chain trading agent competition, Trading Agent Competition - Supply Chain
Management (TAC-SCM, Collins et al. 2006). In TAC-SCM literature, various
studies provided models of automated supply chain management agents. Among
the supply chain trading agent models, we select the main strategies of two bestperformed models, DeepMaize (Kiekintveld et al. 2006) and TacTex (Pardoe and
Stone, 2009), and implemented two types of agents Agent-D and Agent-T
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respectively to use them as competing strategies in the market. In the simulation,
we used 30 agents incorporating 3 different strategies (10 agents for each strategy:
10 Agent-D instances, 10 Agent-T instances, and 10 SCMaster instances) to
implement a more realistic competition scenario in supply chain markets. Each
simulation run is for a period of 250 days at the end of which the agents are
evaluated based on their net profit accumulated. We ran simulations in six different
situations modeling unfavorable market conditions to SCMaster: ±10% of errors on
the demand estimation, ±10% of errors on the profit estimation, and ±10% of
distribution changes in actual demand and supply at the same time from the baseline
distributions.
To test the adaptability of agents’ strategy under adverse market conditions, we
adopted concepts from the Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) (J. Maynard Smith
and Price 1973). The EGT has been widely used in many fields, such as economics,
sociology, biology, computer science, etc., since it provides the theoretical
framework to observe the competition among different strategies in a population
over time using natural selection. We observe the growth rate of the agents in a
population based on replicator dynamics (RD). Since the competition and the
growth rate of agents in our simulation closely reflect the competition and the
market’s selection of strategies in real-world, our experiment can also be considered
a simulated software market. In each experiment we run the simulations until we
reach an equilibrium state in which the proportion of agents of each type in a
population does not change over time.
Organization of the Study
The rest of this study is composed as follows. In section 2, the related studies
regarding the supply chain trading agents’ performance measurement and the
evaluation of the adaptability of agents’ strategy are discussed. In section 3, the
simulation environment consisting of customers, suppliers, three type of supply
chain agents, and the performance measurements are described. In section 4, the
results of simulations are discussed. In the last section, we conclude and discuss
future research improvements.

RELATED WORK
In the supply chain trading agent simulation, measuring the performance of agents
is an important issue. In the literature for supply chain trading agents, simulations
are frequently used to emulate the interaction among agents because a simulation
provides a controlled experiment environment. One such supply chain trading agent
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simulation is provided by TAC-SCM. The TAC-SCM is a tournament in which
intelligent agents compete against each other to maximize profit in the personal
computer (PC) market, and its specification is given in Collins et al. (2006). In this
simulation, agents win customers’ sales orders, purchase components from multiple
suppliers, store the components at its storage, assemble components into PCs at
their factory, and ship the PCs to fulfill customer orders. The winner of simulation
is the agent that yields the highest profit among six agents after multiple days of
trading in the supply chain environment. In the literature of TAC-SCM, most of the
agents use strategies based on optimization techniques such as greedy algorithms
and a family of linear programming methods.
While the performance of agents in a game in TAC-SCM is measured by the profits
of agents, it is difficult to compare the results created from different executions of
simulations because each execution of simulation provides different demand and
supply level. The simulation environment from Swedish Institution of Computer
Science (SICS) was used by many agent development teams, but it is hard to
compare the profit of a simulation to those from other simulations since the
distribution of supply and demand are created randomly. To overcome the
limitation of these simulation environments, the concept of demand-adjusted profit
(DAP) was proposed by Wellman et al. (2006) to directly compare a result of a
simulation to those from other simulations. The team from University of Minnesota
suggested a model of Controlling Server, which provides the same market
conditions in multiple executions of simulation in Borghetti and Sodomka (2006).
In this server, their focus is to manipulate a market condition and to secure the
randomness in each execution of simulation while the server provides the
repeatability during multiple executions of simulation. Focusing more on the
manipulation of the market condition, they suggested Market Relief and Market
Pressure Agents to control the market environment. Although TAC-SCM provided
a valuable framework for supply chain trading agent competition, it still has several
limitations. In each round of competition the number of agents is fixed to six and
no two strategies are identical. Due to these restrictions the effect of interactions
from other instances of agents are smaller than that in a larger-population game.
Also, we cannot observe the result yielded when agents with the same strategy
compete against each other. In a simulation setting with multiple agents of same
type, agents with the same strategy can compete against each other or they might
form a group against the agents having different strategies. It is not possible to
observe such a scenario in TAC-SCM games while such a situation is frequently
found in various markets.
Another group of supply chain trading agents adopted Reinforcement Learning
(RL) techniques since it is generally known that artificial intelligence algorithms
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could provide better performance with self-adaptive agents in a supply chain with
complex and stochastic demand patterns than mathematical or optimization
techniques (Mortazavi, Arshadi Khamseh, and Azimi 2015). Although these studies
showed that RL techniques provide a better performance to supply chain trading
agents, their simulation is conducted in a linear supply chain setting, in which there
exist very few suppliers or customers in up or down streams of the supply chain.
Therefore, it is also hard to predict the performance of such agents when the agents
are used in a multi-agent competition environment.
When considering the characteristics of complex adaptive system, it is more
reasonable to use the changes in the composition of population over time to decide
which strategy provides better adaptability rather than considering a snapshot of the
composition of population. Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) (Weibull 1997) and
the notion of Replicator Dynamics (RD) in EGT provides a way to study the
dynamics of a population of strategies based on its payoffs (Sikora and You 2014).
In addition, EGT provides the notion of Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) to
measure the robustness of a strategy. In EGT, a strategy is evolutionarily stable if a
population of individuals using that strategy cannot be invaded by a group of
alternative strategy (Liu et al. 2016).
Due to these advantages of EGT, studies using multi-agent modeling in various
fields have applied the EGT concepts and observed the evolution of agents to
determine which strategy is the most appropriate strategy in a given environment.
Amir, Evstigneev, and Schenk-Hoppé (2013) proposed a model of financial market,
in which actors invest according to their individual decision (i.e., the strategy
profile in the model) to identify investment strategies that guarantee the “long-run
survival” of any investor using them. In their model, investors are able to change
their strategy depending on the inputs from the environment. According to Amir,
Evstigneev, and Schenk-Hoppé (2013), the notion of a survival portfolio rule is
similar to the notion of ESS introduced by Smith and Price (1973) and Schaffer
(1988, 1989), and the concepts of survival and extinction are the ones proposed in
EGT (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Samuelson 1998; Sandholm 2010; VegaRedondo 1996; Weibull 1997).
You and Sikora (2014) and Sikora and You (2014) applied the concept of RD to
study reputation mechanisms and rating bias. They used agent-based modeling
approach to simulate realistic market conditions. They created seller agents and
buyer agents using different strategies (reputation model and strategic behaviour)
and conducted simulations. Xiao et al. (2015) applied the dynamic placement of
virtual machines for the power saving of data center. For a virtualized data center,
the most effective issue is to allocate virtual machines dynamically. They proposed
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that an algorithm based on EGT can be a better solution. In their study, they used
multiple decision makers in a game and allowed some of them to give up their best
strategy depending on the situation. At the end of a game, virtual machines are
mapped into multiplayers in the evolutionary game. Similar approach is made in
Arora, Singh, and Gupta (2016). They used EGT on the cryptographic protocol
selection problem for wireless sensor networks since wireless sensor networks have
many aspects in common with biological behaviors in decision making and
cooperation (Arora, Singh, and Gupta 2016), and the algorithm chooses a “better”
strategy in various situations.
Adami, Schossau, and Hintze (2014) provided an insight on the validity of the
application of agent-based method where purely mathematical treatment cannot be
applied. In their study, they suggested the agent-based method as a feasible
modeling method to evaluate the realistic models based on the EGT while a
mathematical method still plays an essential role to describe the agent-based
methods. Liu et al. (2016) proposed a general robustness measure of incentive
mechanism against bounded rational players. In their study, they suggested a
general robustness measure and a simulation framework for a quantitative
evaluation at first, and, then, implemented and validated the framework by applying
it on a simulation in which four agents have four different incentive reputation
mechanisms in e-market place. The result of the simulation shows that agent-based
simulation also provided the same result expected in the analytical prediction based
on a modified simples analysis approach (Liu et al. 2016).

THE SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
Our simulation model is a personal computer (PC) market where multiple agents
compete against each other for higher profits. In the simulation, supply chain
trading agents purchase components from a supplier, assemble them into PCs, and
sell them to customers through auction. The performance of each agent is measured
by their profits. The simulation is composed largely of three parts: supplier,
customers, and supply chain agents.
Suppliers and Procurement Process
Suppliers in the simulation provide components of PCs, so agents need to acquire
components from suppliers to assemble PCs. Suppliers and agents interact by
exchanging RFQs and related offers. To purchase the components of PCs, agents
send RFQs to suppliers every day. Then, suppliers return offers to agents. When
issuing offers, suppliers apply a priority mechanism for offer price and supply
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amount allocation, so that more loyal customers could be offered lower prices and
larger supply amounts. The priority mechanism named reputation, is adopted from
the specification of TAC-SCM in Collins et al. (2006). The reputation is defined as
shown in Eq. (1) and (2).
Ϛ𝑎 =

𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑎

(1)

𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑎

where 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑎 is the sum of the quantities in all the orders by agent
𝑎, and 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑎 is the sum of quantities in all the offers issued by the
supplier to the agent 𝑎. By considering Ϛ𝑎 , suppliers may measure which agent is
more likely to purchase their components for a given procurement offer. With the
value of Ϛ𝑎 , suppliers will calculate the final reputation value as follows:
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑎 =

min ( 𝑎𝑝𝑟,Ϛ𝑎 )

(2)

𝑎𝑝𝑟

where 𝑎𝑝𝑟 is the acceptable purchase ratio. This concept is used to prevent
excessive punishment for not purchasing the component because agents should not
be punished for purchasing from only one supplier.
When a supplier has enough capacity, it may provide a full amount to all RFQs.
However, if the supplier does not have enough available capacity for all RFQs,
suppliers issue partial offers to distribute the supply amount to RFQs by applying
the concept of conflict in Eq. (3).
∀r ∈ 𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 , 𝑞r𝑝 = 𝑞𝑟′ − 𝐶 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡

𝑞𝑟′ (1⁄𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑚)
∑𝑟′ ∈𝑅
𝑞′ (1⁄𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑚)
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 𝑟′

(3)

where 𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 , is the group of RFQ of which sum quantity is not met by the
supplier, 𝑞r𝑝 is new price of RFQ r for product (=component) p, 𝑞𝑟′ is the RFQ
quantity, 𝐶 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 is conflict amount, and 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟 is the reputation of the
agent that issued RFQ r. Once partial offers are created, suppliers also create
earliest-possible-offers to fulfill the amounts not filled by partial offers and send all
offers to agents.
Customer and Sales Process
In the simulation customers purchase PCs from agents through a sealed first-price
auction. Since the issue of the customer demand is to maintain the repeatability and
randomness at the same time as indicated in Borghetti and Sodomka (2006), we
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combined a pre-defined demand distribution (stored in a distribution table), a
Poisson distribution, and a random function to achieve the goal.
Customers use a pre-defined daily demand amount for each PC type (stored in a
distribution table). To issue customer RFQs, we assumed a Poisson distribution as
in the specification of Collins et al. (2006). Hence, customers create RFQs by using
Poisson distribution as follows:
𝑁 = 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝑄)

(4)

where 𝑁 is the number of sales RFQs of the day, and 𝑄 is the average of Poisson
distribution. For the demand amount for each RFQ, customers select the due date
of each RFQ randomly in between three and twelve days after the current day. After
selecting the due date, customers choose the number of products randomly between
three and twelve as defined in Eq. (5) to decide the demand amount of the day:
𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑑𝑝 = 𝑀𝐼𝑁( 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚(3,12), 𝐷𝑑𝑝 )

(5)

where 𝑄𝑡𝑦𝑑𝑝 is the order quantity on day d, and 𝐷𝑑𝑝 is the demand amount of product
p on day d. Once RFQs are created, customers send RFQs to trading agents, and the
agents return offers to win the orders. From among the sales offers from agents,
customers choose an offer having the lowest bidding price. If multiple agents bid
the same lowest price, customer randomly chooses one offer.
Agents in the Simulation
The key players of this simulation are agents, and agents compete against each other
to acquire suppliers’ component and to win customers’ sales. The revenue of each
agent comes from sales of PCs to customers, and the cost of the agent occurs from
the component purchase cost, storage holding cost, and penalty for late delivery.
Individual agents have their own factory that can assemble any type of PC, and
production is limited based on daily capacity. After purchase of components or after
the production, components and completed PCs are stored in the storage. For the
storage usage, the component holding and product holding costs are charged daily.
For the delivery of products to customers, agents establish a shipping schedule
every day, but if the production inventory does not satisfy the entire quantity in an
order, agents are not able to ship the product for the order.
We created two types of competing agents by adopting two best-preforming
strategies from the TAC-SCM literature. First agent was created from the main
strategy of DeepMaize (Kiekintveld et al. 2006) and it is named Agent-D. Agent-D
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uses the concept of reference inventory trajectory and the baseline buffer level for
the estimation of procurement amount. To find the best bidding price, Agent-D
maximizes the sum of the increase of expected profits of sales offers. Agent-D uses
supply and demand amount prediction tables and fills the tables with prediction
data. In our simulation, we provided the exact prediction to Agent-D by filling the
tables with the actual values used for supplier and customer’s distribution tables.
Second agent, Agent-T, was created to simulate the TacTex agent in Pardoe and
Stone (2009). For creation of procurement RFQ, Agent-T uses the two inventory
threshold for non-CPU components and CPU components. For each sales offer,
Agent-T searches a bidding price by using a greedy algorithm that maximizes the
sum of the increase of expected profits of sales offers. Agent-T establishes shipment
schedules depending on the availability of PC inventory at first, and it schedules
additional production for unfilled orders by using a greedy algorithm. Agent-T also
uses supply and demand amount prediction tables for the same purpose as that of
Agent-D, so the tables are also filled with the actual values.
The third agent used was SCMaster presented in Lee and Sikora (2016). SCMaster
uses several machine-learning techniques to enhance the adaptibility of its strategy
to deal with the changes in environment. SCMaster uses the inventory threshold
mechanism like other agents in TAC-SCM literature, but it controls the threshold
dynamically to reduce the inventory cost and to maintain the appropriate level of
inventory for production at the same time by combining Q-Learning, Softmax, and
ε-greedy reinforcement learning algorithms. Production module is enhanced from
the one used in Tac-Tex (Pardoe and Stone 2009) by applying a modified greedy
algorithm. When scheduling the production, SCMaster allocates production
resources to the production of the orders that are past due or that do not have enough
product inventory for the completion of the orders. SCMaster’s sales strategy is
focused on the prediction of exact winning prices because the key part of winning
orders in the auction is a better prediction of bidding price. To achieve this,
SCMaster uses a sliding window protocol (R. T. Sikora and Sachdev 2008). This
algorithm enables SCMaster to improve its bidding price by using finer price bands
for more competitive intervals of prices and coarser price bands for less competitive
intervals of prices. It does that by learning and dynamically adjusting the price
bands as simulation continues. For the prediction of demand and supply amount,
SCMaster also uses supply and demand amount prediction tables. In the case of
SCMaster, however, we filled the tables with the exact values when running the noestimation-errors simulation, and the tables are filled with incorrect values (e.g.,
10% of demand prediction error values or 10% of supply prediction error values,
etc.) when running simulations for prediction error situations. In this way, we want
to test the robustness and adaptability of SCMaster in the presence of adverse
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market conditions that lead to estimation errors on both the supply and demand
distributions.
Modification of Simulation
Even though the simulation in this study is motivated by TAC-SCM in Collins et
al. (2006), several of its features were modified to implement a more realistic
business environment. First, we assumed a continuum of business environment with
no specific start or end of the simulation. Therefore, none of the agents in this study
use any algorithm for the initial status of the simulation or the end of the simulation.
The reason for not considering the concept of start, end, and data from previous
simulations is that this is not possible in the real world. Secondly, we pre-define a
demand distribution rather than create them by a random function. As defined in
the section 3.2, we combined a pre-defined daily demand distribution and a random
demand due date for the creation of an order to secure the randomness and
repeatability. In addition, the distributions of the customer demand and the supply
capacity are shared among competitor agents to allow them to have high prediction
accuracy.
Replicator Dynamics
One of the primary goals of this paper is to assess the adaptability of our model’s
strategy in a trading market. One way of documenting that adaptability is to
empirically study the growth of the agents’ strategies in a population containing
competing strategies. To do so, we borrow the concept of replicator dynamics (RD)
from evolutionary game theory (Weibull, J. W., 1995). RD studies the dynamics of
a population of strategies that replicates based on its payoff. In our case, the
strategies represent the different SCM models used by the agents. At each time
period, a population of agents takes part in the market simulation. Each agent uses
a different model and performs the tasks of procurement, sales, and scheduling in
accordance with its model. The agent’s gain is treated as its fitness, and agents breed
from one generation to the next in proportion to their average fitness. The changes
of the relative composition of the population of agents using different types of
models can be an indicator of the effect on change in agent behavior.
One can model RD as a set of difference equations. Let N be the total number of
agents, xit be the proportion of agents who are using model i at time t, and uit be the
average gain of the agents using model i at time t. Then it follows that the proportion
of agents using model i at time t+1 is given by
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We can study the evolution of popularity of different SCM models within a
population of agents by studying the evolution of xit.
After adjustment of the composition of population, a series of simulations, which
are called generations, are continued until the composition of population reaches an
equilibrium, a stable state where the composition of population does not change
over time. In all simulations, we assumed a uniform customer demand distribution
with a mean of 2000 and a standard deviation of 10 as a baseline demand
distribution. In the first four simulation setups, we modified SCMaster’s prediction
module to cause four types of prediction errors while other agents have exact
prediction of customer demand distribution. In the fifth and sixth simulation, we
modified actual demand and supply distributions to cause two types of prediction
errors to all agents in the simulation. The six types of modification include: ±10%
of errors on the agent’s internal demand estimation only for SCMaster, ±10% of
errors on the agent’s internal profit estimation only for SCMaster, ±10% of
distribution change in actual demand and supply.

RESULTS
No Estimation Errors
This simulation is a baseline setting to compare its results to those from other
simulations. In this experiment, the baseline performance of three types of agent
are measured. The three types of agents in this simulation have perfect predictions
on customer demand and suppliers’ capacity. We used a population of 30 agents,
ten for each type of SCM agent (10 Agent-D instances, 10 Agent-T instances, and
10 SCMaster instances).
The experiments of this setting were conducted under a uniform demand
distribution with a mean of 2000 and a standard deviation of 10. Table 1 represents
the changes of the average profit of each agent type with their count in the
population, and Figure 1 depicts the changes in the composition of population. As
seen in Figure 1, Agent-D is eliminated from the population at the fourth generation,
and the proportion of Agent-T diminishes from the fourth generation. Finally, at the
sixth generation, SCMaster takes over the entire population, and the population
reaches an equilibrium. As mentioned earlier, in real world situations the
composition of competition is dynamic; weaker agents do not survive whereas

©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017

78

ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy

Journal of International Technology and Information Management

Volume 28, Number 3 2019

stronger agents become more established. Moreover, the performance of the agents
itself depends on such composition (stronger agents do better when competing
against weaker agents than when competing against other stronger agents). It is this
constant feedback loop (where performance depends on composition of agents, but
the composition of agents in turn depends on their performance) that we have tried
to simulate in our experiments and the results demonstrate this. As shown in Figure
2, although the SCMaster agents takes over the population their average profit
keeps falling as their numbers grow in the population since they are now competing
with stronger agents (i.e., competing amongst themselves). They earn an average
profit of 6.03m when competing against different types of agents. But when they
overtake the entire population they are competing against their own strategy and
their average profit drops to 3.26m.

Table 1. No estimation errors
Generation

SCM aster

Agent-D

Agent-T

Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count
1

6.03

10

-2.41

10

3.56

10

2

6.15

12

-2.17

7

3.29

11

3

6.16

15

0.38

4

3.27

11

4

4.03

24

0

0

0.6

6

5

3.75

27

0

0

-7.37

3

6

3.26

30

0

0

0

0
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Figure 1. The changes in the composition of population with no estimation
errors

Figure 2. Performance of SCMaster with no estimation errors
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Overestimation and Underestimation of Demand by 10 %
To test the robustness of the strategy of SCMaster in the presence of estimation
errors, we ran an experiment with overestimation and underestimation of
demand by 10% only for SCMaster while other agents have a perfect
estimation on customer demand.
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Table 2. Overestimation of demand by 10%
Generation

SCM aster

Agent-D

Agent-T

Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count
1

6.06

10

-3.63

10

3.44

10

2

6.02

14

-1.41

5

3

11

3

6.26

16

-12.54

3

3

11

4

5.69

19

0

0

3.24

11

5

4.72

23

0

0

2.69

7

6

3.77

26

0

0

-4.75

4

7

3.11

29

0

0

-28.88

1

8

3.16

30

0

0

0

0

Table 2 provides the results from 10% overestimation of demand. The composition
of population has the same pattern as that in the baseline experiment. Agent-D is
eliminated at the fourth generation. After the extinction of Agent-D, the population
of Agent-T begins to decrease, and finally the population reaches the equilibrium
at the eighth generation.

Table 3. Underestimation of demand by 10%
Generation

SCM aster

Agent-D

Agent-T

Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count
1

5.94

10

-4.74

10

3.57

10

2

5.94

13

-0.54

5

3.16

12

3

6.24

16

-8.38

3

3.09

11

4

5.53

18

-33.49

1

3.33

11

5

5.49

19

0

0

3.2

11

6

4.76

22

0

0

3.15

8

7

4.23

24

0

0

0.35

6

8

3.56

27

0

0

-7.22

3

9

3.21

30

0

0

0

0

Table 3 provides the results from 10% underestimation of demand. The
composition of the population showed slightly different pattern from that in the

©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017

81

ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy

Assessment of Adaptability of a Supply Chain Trading Agent’s Strategy: …

Y.S. Lee et.al.

baseline experiment. Agent-D is eliminated from the population from the fifth
generation, and the population reaches an equilibrium at the ninth generation while
Agent-T begins to decrease from the sixth generation. Based on these results we
can conclude that the SCMaster’s strategy is robust and adaptive enough to handle
the errors in demand estimation.
Overestimation and Underestimation of Profit by 10%
Since one of the key aspects of SCMaster is its preference for producing high profit
products, we test the robustness of its strategy in the presence of errors in estimation
of its profits. To do that, we test its performance with overestimation and
underestimation of profit by 10% only for SCMaster.
The result of simulation for the overestimation of profit is provided in Table 4.
Again, the patterns of the changes in the composition of population are
fundamentally the same to the one in the baseline experiment. Agent-D is
eliminated from the population at the fifth generation. During that time, Agent-T
maintains the same proportion of the population and SCMaster captures Agent-D’s
portion in the population. However, the population of Agent-T also begins to
decrease from the sixth generation, and the entire population is taken up by
SCMaster at the ninth generation and the population reaches an equilibrium.

Table 4. Overestimation of profit by 10%
Generation

SCM aster

Agent-D

Agent-T

Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count
1

5.91

10

-3.46

10

3.53

10

2

6.13

13

-1.17

6

3.31

11

3

6.10

16

-12.05

3

3.24

11

4

5.67

18

-33.89

1

3.31

11

5

5.40

19

0

0

3.29

11

6

4.70

22

0

0

3.04

8

7

4.25

24

0

0

0.28

6

8

3.44

28

0

0

-12.10

2

9

3.30

30

0

0

0

0

The result of simulation for the underestimation of profit is provided in Table 5.
The pattern of the changes in the composition of population is similar to the one in
the baseline experiment. Agent-D disappears from the population at the fifth
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generation and the simulation continues to the ninth generation. Agent-T maintains
the same population until the extinction of Agent-D, but Agent-T declines after
extinction of Agent-D. Hence, we can conclude that SCMaster’s strategy is
adaptive enough to overcome the over or under estimation of profit.

Table 5. Underestimation of profit by 10%
Generation

SCM aster

Agent-D

Agent-T

Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count
1

5.94

10

-2.47

10

3.44

10

2

6.00

13

-2.85

6

3.26

11

3

4.56

16

-12.83

3

1.17

11

4

5.85

18

-34.51

1

3.31

11

5

5.52

19

0

0

3.31

11

6

4.82

22

0

0

3

8

7

4.26

24

0

0

0.97

6

8

3.24

28

0

0

-12.33

2

9

3.28

30

0

0

0

0

Over/Under Demand and Supply
In this simulation we tested the adaptability of our agent’s strategy when all
the agents make an error of 10% (both over and under) in estimating the
demand and supply distributions.
Table 6 presents the results of over estimation of the demand and supply
distributions. We got similar results for under estimation of both demand and
supply distributions. The changes in the composition of population reaches an
equilibrium at the ninth generation. Similar to the evolution pattern in previous
simulations, SCMaster occupies Agent-D’s positions during the decline of AgentD, and, SCMaster takes over the population by the ninth generation after Agent-T’s
elimination from the population. Based on these results, we can conclude that even
in the presence of estimation errors in both supply and demand distributions,
SCMaster is better able to handle the adverse market conditions.
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Table 6. Overestimation of demand and supply by 10%
Generation

SCM aster

Agent-D

Agent-T

Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count
1

5.95

10

-3.5

10

3.57

10

2

6.26

13

-6.08

6

3.45

11

3

6.19

14

-3.16

5

3.42

11

4

6.43

17

-22.67

2

3.39

11

5

6.01

19

0

0

3.29

11

6

5.09

23

0

0

2.13

7

7

3.89

27

0

0

-7.16

3

8

3.84

30

0

0

0

0

Sensitivity Analysis
In previous sections, we conducted simulations in three different types of
error situations under a uniform demand distribution with a mean of 2000 and
a standard deviation of 10, and the results demonstrated the adaptability of
the SCMaster’s strategy. To test whether the results hold under more unstable
environment, we performed a sensitivity analysis with a higher variance of the
demand distributions. We repeated the same set of simulations in previous
sections by applying a uniform demand distribution with a mean of 2000 and
a standard deviation of 100.
In all these simulations the patterns of the changes in the composition of population
were similar to those under the baseline simulation. Based on these results, we can
conclude that the SCMaster’s algorithms for the procurement and bidding to
customer are adaptive enough to overcome the estimation errors created by the
internal or external causes.
SCMaster as an Evolutionary Stable Strategy
In previous sections, we tested the adaptability of SCMaster’s strategy in
simulations in which all types of agents start with the same number of agents in the
population. Another concept from evolutionary game theory that is related to the
stability of an equilibrium strategy is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), first
proposed by (John Maynard Smith 1982). In the context of evolutionary game
theory, a strategy is ESS if a small proportion of that strategy can invade a
population of other strategies and completely overtake it. It has been shown that a
strict Nash equilibrium strategy (i.e., a stable Nash equilibrium where a player
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making a small change away from the equilibrium becomes worse off) also implies
an ESS (Weibull 1997).
In the next set of experiments, we wanted to study whether SCMaster was such an
ESS and what was the minimum proportion of SCMaster strategies needed to
takeover a population of Agent-D and Agent-T strategies. We used a uniform
demand distribution with a mean of 2000 and a standard deviation of 100 and used
a population of 30 instances. In the first experiment with Agent–D, the minimum
number of initial SCMaster strategy needed to take over the entire population was
4. Table 7 gives the evolution of the population and by the ninth generation
SCMaster takes over the entire population to reach an equilibrium. In the next
experiment with Agent–T, the minimum number of initial SCMaster strategies
needed to take over the entire population was 8. Table 8 shows the changes in the
composition of population and by seventh generation SCMaster takes over the
entire population to reach an equilibrium. In the last experiment with both Agent–
T and Agent-D, the minimum number of initial SCMaster strategies needed to take
over the entire population was 5. Table 9 gives the changes in the composition of
population and by 11th generation SCMaster takes over the entire population to
reach an equilibrium. Although a single SCMaster strategy is not able to invade and
take over an entire population consisting of competing strategies, a very small
proportion of SCMaster strategies is able to do so in all situations. The above results
imply that SCMaster is a type of evolutionary stable strategy.

Table 7. Result with Agent-D when the initial number of SCMaster = 4
Generation

SCM aster

Agent-D

Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count
1

3.26

4

0.2

26

2

4.02

5

0.8

25

3

5.50

7

-0.14

23

4

6.31

11

1.46

19

5

6.39

14

-0.27

16

6

5.69

19

-2.81

11

7

4.27

25

-4.84

5

8

3.30

29

-868.88

1

9

3.30

30

0

0
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Table 8. Result with Agent-T when the initial number of SCMaster = 8
Generation

SCM aster

Agent-T

Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count
1

3.15

8

1.83

22

2

4.98

12

2.51

18

3

6.02

17

3.05

13

4

4.69

22

3.12

8

5

4.51

24

1.01

6

6

3.78

27

-7.24

3

7

3.3

30

0

0

Table 9. Result with both Agent-D and Agent-T when the initial number of
SCMaster = 5
Generation

SCM aster

Agent-D

Agent-T

Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count Avg. Profit (m) Count
1

4.04

5

-5.3

13

3.21

13

2

3.86

7

-1.01

6

3.34

18

3

4.1

8

-6.39

4

3.08

19

4

4.16

10

-28.65

1

2.05

20

5

4.53

11

0

0

2.6

20

6

5.3

15

0

0

2.57

16

7

5.39

20

0

0

3.25

11

8

4.19

23

0

0

2,93

8

9

3.86

25

0

0

0.32

6

10

3.51

28

0

0

-7.27

3

11

3.15

31

0

0

0

0

CONCLUSION
In this paper we studied the evolution of strategies used by supply chain agents
when the different agents are competing against each other to manage a supply
chain most profitably in a single marketplace. We used multi-agent modelling to
simulate a realistic marketplace consisting of different types of supply chain agents.
Using the concept of replicator dynamics we studied the evolution of a population
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of supply chain agents consisting of three different types of strategies. Our results
indicate that given a choice of strategies to use, agents prefer to switch to using our
adaptive SCMaster model over time. We also simulated scenarios of adverse market
conditions by inserting errors in the estimation of demand, supply and profit. In all
scenarios we found the SCMaster model to be the most adaptive. This has important
implications for the designers of automated and intelligent supply chain agents. As
a methodology, it provides a tool to test whether a given strategy will be able to
compete and survive in a population of other strategies. As a strategy to be used by
a supply chain agent, it shows that SCMaster is a better strategy.
SCMaster’s strategy is most adaptive among the three strategies we tested as it uses
dynamic inventory control and various reinforcement learning techniques like Qlearning, Softmax, ε-greedy, and sliding window protocol to make the agent adapt
dynamically to the changing environment created by competing agents. Using
concepts from evolutionary game theory, we also conducted experiments that
showed that SCMaster was a type of evolutionary stable strategy akin to a stable
Nash equilibrium.
There are several limitations of the study presented in this paper. The foremost is
that we only tested the evolution of a population of fixed strategies. In future we
plan on designing experiments where the individual strategies themselves evolve
over time by combining bits and pieces from the existing strategies to see if any
newer and stronger strategies are discovered. The other limitation of this study is
that although we tested scenarios of different demand and supply distributions these
distributions or environment stayed static within each simulation. In future we want
to test simulations where the environment in terms of the supply and demand
distributions changes over time to reflect seasonal changes or economic cycle
changes.
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